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PRECEDENTIAL 
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_____________ 
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_____________ 
 
GEORGE T. VICKERS, JR. 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT GRATERFORD SCI; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA, 
                                             Appellants 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (W.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-00432) 
 Honorable Robert C. Mitchell, Magistrate Judge 
_______________ 
 
Argued: December 5, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER*, KRAUSE, and MELLOY**, Circuit 
Judges. 
                                              
* Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Third Circuit, assumed senior status on February 1, 2017. 
** Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by 
designation. 
Case: 15-4012     Document: 003112643487     Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/06/2017
2 
 
 
(Filed: June 6, 2017) 
_______________ 
 
George T. Vickers, Jr. 
Graterford SCI 
P.O. Box 244 
Graterford, PA 19426 
              Pro Se 
 
Jerome A. Moschetta      [Argued] 
Washington County Office of District Attorney 
1 South Main Street 
Suite 1003 
Washington, PA 15301 
          Counsel for Appellants 
 
David R. Fine      [Argued]  
K&L Gates LLP  
17 North Second Street 
18th Floor 
Harrisburg, PA 17101 
 
J. Nicholas Ranjan 
K&L Gates LLP  
210 Sixth Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
               Amicus Counsel for Appellee1   
                                              
 1 We express our gratitude to David R. Fine and J. 
Nicholas Ranjam of K&L Gates LLP for accepting this matter 
pro bono and for the quality of their briefing and argument in 
this case.  Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest 
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_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Given the fundamental importance of the right to a 
jury trial in our justice system, many states have promulgated 
rules, akin to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
prescribing that the waiver of that right be on-the-record and 
approved by a court before a defendant enters a guilty plea or 
proceeds by way of  non-jury trial.  As a general matter, such 
procedures are diligently followed to ensure a defendant’s 
waiver is knowing and voluntary but, on occasion, there are 
lapses.  In this case, petitioner’s counsel discussed with him 
generally the right to a jury trial but failed to secure an on-
the-record waiver or to apprise petitioner of all aspects of his 
jury trial right before proceeding with a bench trial—conduct 
the District Court determined established ineffective 
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), and justified the grant of habeas relief.   
On appeal by the Commonwealth, we are called upon 
to decide whether counsel’s deficiency on these facts gave 
                                                                                                     
service that members of the bar can offer to indigent parties 
and to the legal profession. 
 
Case: 15-4012     Document: 003112643487     Page: 3      Date Filed: 06/06/2017
4 
 
rise to structural error, such that Strickland prejudice might be 
presumed, or whether petitioner is still required to establish 
prejudice.  Because we conclude a showing of prejudice is 
required, we also have occasion to address the nature of that 
showing and to modify our holding in United States v. Lilly, 
536 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2008), in light of intervening Supreme 
Court precedent.  As we hold the proper prejudice inquiry in 
this situation is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that, 
but for his counsel’s deficient performance, petitioner would 
have exercised his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and 
petitioner here has failed to make that showing, we will 
reverse the judgment of the District Court. 
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History  
Petitioner George Vickers’s conviction stems from an 
incident in which Vickers punched the victim a single time 
but that punch caused severe injuries.  As reflected in the 
record from his 2009 trial, the victim first encountered 
Vickers at a bar where Vickers was socializing with the 
victim’s ex-girlfriend.  After a brief stay at the bar, the victim 
left to catch a bus home.  While waiting at the bus stop, the 
victim was “struck from behind” in the “upper neck, shoulder, 
and back area,” which caused him to stumble.  App. 38.2  
Though he did not know who shoved him, as he stumbled, he 
“looked up” and “saw George Vickers,” who was “a step and 
a half away.”  App. 38.  Within seconds of being shoved, the 
victim was “struck over his right eye by what he thought was 
a closed fist” and fell to the ground, unconscious.  App. 38.  
The victim suffered numerous serious injuries, including a 
fractured skull, brain hemorrhaging, and bruising of the brain, 
                                              
 2  All citations to the Appendix refer to what has been 
labeled Appendix Volume II on the public docket.  
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and was in a coma for four days as a result of the blow.  
Vickers was charged with aggravated assault, recklessly 
endangering another person, harassment, and disorderly 
conduct.   
 The issues on appeal all concern the adequacy of the 
legal representation Vickers received in connection with the 
waiver of his right to a jury trial.  Pennsylvania law provides 
that in order for a criminal case to be tried without a jury, 
“[t]he judge shall ascertain from the defendant whether this is 
a knowing and intelligent waiver, and such colloquy shall 
appear on the record.  The waiver shall be in writing, made a 
part of the record, and signed by the defendant, the attorney 
for the Commonwealth, the judge, and the defendant’s 
attorney as a witness.”  234 Pa. Code § 620.  Vickers was 
originally represented by private counsel, and although his 
case was placed on the Court of Common Pleas calendar as a 
bench trial, these state-mandated procedures were not 
followed in Vickers’s case.  Vickers’s private counsel later 
withdrew from his representation and, just a few weeks 
before Vickers’s bench trial was to commence, an assistant 
public defender was assigned to the case.  Because the case 
was already calendared as a bench trial, Vickers’s new 
counsel presumed, without confirming, that Vickers had 
formally waived his right to a jury trial at an earlier point, and 
the bench trial went forward as scheduled.  The judge who 
presided found Vickers guilty on all counts and sentenced 
him to seven to fourteen years’ imprisonment.   
Following his conviction, Vickers filed a petition for 
relief under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”).  In that petition he claimed, among other things, 
that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel “misled [him] on his right to have a jury 
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trial,” and failed to “obtain a valid waiver” of that right before 
proceeding with a bench trial.  App. 61, 73.  The PCRA Court 
held an evidentiary hearing, at which Vickers’s trial counsel 
and Vickers testified regarding counsel’s representation.   
According to the testimony of counsel, when counsel 
saw the case was already scheduled as a bench trial he 
“assumed there had been a normal waiver at the bar and 
whatnot like that,” and, based on that assumption, did not 
conduct any investigation to determine “what, in fact, 
occurred with regard to the waiver of [Vickers’s] jury trial 
rights.” App. 99-100.  Counsel also testified, however, that he 
had spoken with Vickers “generally, about the right to a jury 
trial,” App. 96, that he advised Vickers as to his right to have 
“12 men and women decide the facts of the case as opposed 
to a judge deciding the facts, and just the fundamentals,” App. 
95, and that he understood Vickers to be familiar with the 
criminal justice system because Vickers informed him that he 
had been charged with a felony in a neighboring county the 
previous year.  Counsel further testified that he inquired of 
Vickers every time they spoke, including on the day of the 
trial, whether Vickers wanted a jury trial or a bench trial, and 
Vickers consistently wanted to proceed with the scheduled 
bench trial.  
Counsel’s testimony also detailed his strategic 
discussions with Vickers which, in counsel’s view, had led 
Vickers to opt for a bench trial.  For example, counsel 
testified he told Vickers that he believed Vickers’s best 
chance of prevailing on the felony charge of aggravated 
assault was to emphasize that this was a “one-punch case,” 
and to argue that Vickers did not have the requisite intent to 
cause the serious bodily injury necessary to support a 
conviction—a “narrow legal issue”—he told Vickers “might 
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be lost to a panel of jurors,” but might be appreciated by a 
judge who could more reliably “distinguish between the 
aggravating factors.” App. 107, 109.  Counsel elaborated that 
he warned Vickers that there were risks associated with a 
bench trial because “this courtroom can be a conservative 
with personal injuries, and that’s a judge’s prerogative when 
they listen to the evidence,” App. 95, but he ultimately 
recommended that Vickers pursue a bench trial for strategic 
reasons.  According to counsel, Vickers “never” expressed a 
preference for a jury trial during these tactical conversations, 
App. 118, but rather “indicated he wanted to go forward” 
with a bench trial, App. 95.   
Counsel could not recall specifically what he told 
Vickers about his right to a jury trial and did not state—and 
was not specifically asked by Vickers’s PCRA counsel—if he 
informed Vickers that any jury verdict would have to be 
unanimous.  Nonetheless, while counsel acknowledged that 
he “did not go through the whole colloquy form” with 
Vickers, App. 99, he confirmed that he firmly believed, as a 
result of his many conversations with Vickers leading up to 
trial and Vickers’s past experience with the criminal justice 
system, that Vickers was aware of his right to proceed by jury 
trial instead of a bench trial, “understood the difference 
between the two,” and chose to go forward with a bench trial.  
App. 100. 
Vickers’s testimony at the PCRA hearing painted a 
very different picture.  Vickers testified that he “advised [his 
counsel] during several phone conversations . . . that it was 
[his] intent to take this to a jury trial,” App. 139, that he had 
no understanding at the time of the trial that he was giving up 
this right, and that he first discovered that he had a 
constitutional right to a jury trial when doing legal research 
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for his appeal while incarcerated.  Before that point, 
according to Vickers, he mistakenly thought only a majority 
of the jury was required to return a guilty verdict but, even on 
that mistaken assumption, he believed this “majority rules” 
system was preferable to relying on the sole discretion of a 
judge, App. 140, and would have exercised his right to a jury 
trial had he been given the opportunity.  
On cross-examination, when presented with a guilty 
plea form that he had signed in 2004 in connection with one 
of his prior convictions, Vickers acknowledged he had signed 
the form and had checked the boxes on it that appeared next 
to each of the rights attendant to a jury trial, but he asserted 
he had not read the form.  That form provided that, by 
pleading guilty, Vickers was waiving his right to a jury trial 
and all attendant rights, including the right to have “[a]ll 12 
members of the jury finely selected . . . be satisfied that the 
Commonwealth had proven [his] guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt on each charge, that is, the vote of all 12 must be guilty 
before [he] can be found guilty.”  App. 149-50.  
The PCRA court carefully evaluated the conflicting 
testimony presented at the hearing and found “the testimony 
of [counsel] credible and the testimony of George Vickers not 
credible.” App. 176.  Accordingly, the court reasoned that, 
even though Vickers had not waived his right to a jury trial in 
writing or orally on the record, he was not denied effective 
assistance of counsel because he made a strategic decision to 
pursue a bench trial and “freely, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived his jury trial rights.”  App. 177.   
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, finding “no 
basis” to disturb the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, 
and concluding, like the PCRA court, that because Vickers’s 
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waiver of his jury trial right was knowing and voluntary, he 
had not established that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.3  App. 191.  
 His state remedies exhausted, Vickers filed a petition 
for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he re-
asserted his claim that counsel was ineffective for proceeding 
with a bench trial when Vickers had not waived his right to a 
                                              
 3 Vickers argues that the PCRA court and Superior 
Court erred by extrapolating from his 2004 plea form to hold 
that any future waiver of the jury trial right would be knowing 
and voluntary.  We agree that such reasoning, had it formed 
the basis for the courts’ decisions, would be disturbing and 
fallacious.  Here, however, it is apparent that, to the extent 
those courts relied on the document at all, it was in 
connection with broader credibility findings, determining—
from Vickers’s assertion in his direct testimony that he had no 
knowledge of any right to a jury trial before he began 
preparing his appeal, the cross-examination of Vickers 
concerning the plea form that proved otherwise, and 
Vickers’s counsel’s testimony that Vickers indicated his 
understanding, based in part on his criminal history, of his 
right to a jury trial and how it differed from a bench trial—
that “the testimony of [counsel was] credible and the 
testimony of George Vickers [was] not credible.”  App. 176.  
The PCRA court was best situated to assess credibility at the 
hearing, and, for that limited purpose, we perceive no error in 
its use of the form or the Superior Court’s reliance, in turn, on 
the PCRA court’s credibility assessment.  
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jury trial.4  The District Court agreed with Vickers, holding 
that the Superior Court’s decision was “contrary to or 
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 
federal law,” because, irrespective of the testimony at the 
PCRA hearing, the record reflected that there was no written 
or oral waiver of Vickers’s right to a jury trial.  Vickers v. 
Wenerowicz, No. 2:15-CV-432, 2015 WL 7308673, at *6 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2015).5  Citing to the familiar two-part 
test for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the District 
Court determined, first, that counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally deficient for failing to obtain a formal jury-
trial waiver, and, second, albeit without discussing what 
prejudice must be shown in this circumstance or whether 
Vickers had made that showing, that Vickers also “was 
prejudiced” by his counsel’s deficient performance.  Vickers, 
2015 WL 7308673, at *6.    Accordingly, the District Court 
held Vickers was “entitled to relief here,” and granted him a 
                                              
 4 Vickers filed his habeas petition in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and 
the parties consented to proceed through final judgment 
before a Magistrate Judge.  As the Magistrate Judge’s opinion 
and order thus constitute those of the District Court, see 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), we will refer to the Magistrate’s rulings 
as those of the District Court throughout this opinion.  
 
 5 Vickers also raised three other claims for relief that 
were denied by the District Court.  Vickers does not challenge 
those rulings on appeal.  
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writ of habeas corpus.6  Id.  The Commonwealth timely 
appealed, and we appointed amicus curiae to assist Vickers in 
his appellate proceedings.7 
                                              
 6 In its opinion granting Vickers’s petition, the District 
Court noted “a complete dereliction of duty” by the Office of 
the District Attorney for “fail[ing] to defend th[e] litigation 
with any degree of diligence” on the Commonwealth’s behalf 
over the course of the proceeding.  Vickers, 2015 WL 
7308673, at *2.  The troubling pattern of behavior to which 
the District Court referred dates back even as far as the state 
court proceeding, where, e.g., the Commonwealth failed to 
file a brief in response to Vickers’s direct appeal.  That 
pattern also continued into Vickers’s federal proceedings 
when, without any explanation or request for an extension, 
the Commonwealth failed to meet its deadline to file a 
response to Vickers’s habeas petition.  When the District 
Court still had not received any response from the 
Commonwealth nearly two months after that deadline, it 
entered an order for the Commonwealth to show cause why 
Vickers’s request for relief should not be granted due to the 
Commonwealth’s failure to respond to the petition.  Again, 
the Commonwealth failed to respond, prompting the District 
Court to issue another order—this time granting the writ of 
habeas corpus and ordering Vickers discharged from custody 
unless the Commonwealth retried him within ninety days.  
After more than a month passed with still no response from 
the Commonwealth, the District Judge issued a third order 
scheduling a release hearing for the ninety-day date.  Nearly a 
week after this order, the Commonwealth finally awakened to 
the situation and filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
District Court granted.   
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II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.  
Because the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, our review of the District Court’s grant of Vickers’s 
                                                                                                     
 We are deeply disturbed that, notwithstanding that 
wake-up call, the Commonwealth’s “dereliction of duty” has 
continued into this appeal, requiring this Court to issue a 
court order for the Commonwealth to reply to the brief filed 
by amicus on Vickers’s behalf.  At oral argument, counsel for 
the Commonwealth acknowledged these troubling lapses and 
offered an apology to the Court.  We trust that the Office of 
the District Attorney, going forward, will represent the 
Commonwealth and fulfill its obligations to the courts with 
far greater diligence and professionalism.  
 7 Vickers proceeded pro se on appeal and filed a 
responsive brief supporting the District Court’s grant of relief 
on his ineffective assistance claim but also raising a host of 
other claims, such as an alleged violation of his right to a 
speedy trial, presumably as alternative grounds for affirming.  
We do not address the substance of those other claims here, 
as they were not properly exhausted in the state court, and, in 
any event, appear meritless to the extent they are intelligible.  
However, we appointed counsel as amicus to further explore 
Vickers’s more substantial ineffective assistance claim, and 
we consider counsel’s thorough briefing and excellent 
advocacy as simply expounding on Vickers’s own argument.  
For that reason and for simplicity’s sake, we will identify 
arguments, whether raised by amicus or Vickers, as those of 
“Vickers.”  
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petition is plenary.  McMullen v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 236 
(3d Cir. 2009).  
III. Analysis  
 Our review of habeas claims is governed by the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), which instructs that where, as here, a state court 
has rejected a petitioner’s claim on the merits, a federal court 
may not grant the writ unless the state court’s decision “was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  A 
decision is “‘contrary to’ clearly established federal law if  it 
‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth’ in 
Supreme Court precedent, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that 
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the 
Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different’ 
from that reached by the Supreme Court.”  Eley v. Erickson, 
712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration and citation 
omitted) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 
(2000)).   A decision contains an “unreasonable application” 
of clearly established law if no “fairminded jurist[]” could 
agree with the state court’s decision.  Harrington v. Richter, 
562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).   
 While a determination that a state court’s analysis is 
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly 
established federal law is necessary to grant habeas relief, it is 
not alone sufficient.  That is because, despite applying an 
improper analysis, the state court still may have reached the 
correct result, and a federal court can only grant the Great 
Writ if it is “firmly convinced that a federal constitutional 
right has been violated,” Williams, 529 U.S. at 389.  See also 
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Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (“[w]hile it is of 
course a necessary prerequisite to federal habeas relief that a 
prisoner satisfy the AEDPA standard of review . . .  none of 
our post-AEDPA cases have suggested that a writ of habeas 
corpus should automatically issue if a prisoner satisfies the 
AEDPA standard”).  Thus, when a federal court reviewing a 
habeas petition concludes that the state court analyzed the 
petitioner’s claim in a manner that contravenes clearly 
established federal law, it then must proceed to review the 
merits of the claim de novo to evaluate if a constitutional 
violation occurred.8  See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 
(2012).  
  Below, we first address whether AEDPA deference to 
the state court’s denial of relief was warranted, concluding 
that it was not because the state court’s analysis was contrary 
to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.  We then turn 
to our own de novo review of Vickers’s claim that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel.  
 A.  AEDPA Deference  
                                              
 8 These steps sometimes merge in cases in which the 
federal habeas court determines that the state court engaged in 
an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent because it will be apparent from the 
explication of why the state court unreasonably applied that 
precedent that, under any reasonable application, a 
constitutional violation did occur.  See, e.g., Washington v. 
Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 160, 170 (3d Cir. 2015); 
Eley, 712 F.3d at 861.  
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 The Commonwealth contends on appeal that the 
judgment should be reversed because the District Court failed 
to accord appropriate deference to the state court under 
AEDPA, and, applying proper deference, the Superior Court 
did not engage in an “unreasonable application” of Strickland.  
We agree with the Commonwealth that the District Court 
erred, but not because it failed to apply AEDPA deference.   
 Indeed, as a threshold matter, we conclude that no 
AEDPA deference is warranted here because the Superior 
Court failed to apply Strickland altogether, resulting in a 
decision “contrary to” clearly established federal law.  That 
is, even though the Superior Court correctly identified 
Strickland as controlling, it concluded there was no 
ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that Vickers’s 
waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary.  
That, however, is precisely the reasoning that the Supreme 
Court held was contrary to Strickland in Lafler v. Cooper, 
566 U.S. 156 (2012), where the state court had concluded 
there was no ineffective assistance of counsel merely because 
it found petitioner’s rejection of a plea offer to be knowing 
and voluntary.  Id. at 173.  Declining to accord AEDPA 
deference, the Supreme Court held that “[a]n inquiry into 
whether the rejection of a plea is knowing and 
voluntary . . . is not the correct means by which to address a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,” and, because the 
state court “fail[ed] to apply Strickland to assess the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim [petitioner] raised, 
[its] adjudication was contrary to clearly established federal 
law.”  Id.  In Vickers’s case, in other words, the Superior 
Court’s decision was contrary to both Strickland and Lafler.  
 This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry or 
require that the Great Writ be granted.  Instead, as in Lafler 
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itself, it merely forfeits the AEDPA deference to which the 
state court’s denial of relief would otherwise be entitled and 
dictates that we review Vickers’s Strickland claim de novo.  
See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 173-74; Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 
126, 131 (3d Cir. 2011).  That is, we no longer owe deference 
to the state court’s legal conclusions, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 542 (2003), but still “must presume that state-court 
factual findings”—including its credibility findings—“are 
correct unless the presumption is rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence,” Breakiron, 642 F.3d at 131; Jacobs v. 
Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2005).9  Bearing in mind the 
applicable standard of review, we turn to the merits of 
Vickers’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.  
 B. De Novo Review of Vickers’s Claim  
 Reviewing Vickers’s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel de novo, we consider, first, whether counsel’s 
                                              
 9  We have not had occasion, to this point, to 
specifically address the deference we afford to credibility 
findings, as opposed to factual findings more generally, once 
we determine that AEDPA deference is inapplicable.  There 
is no question, however, that credibility findings in that 
context are also presumed correct absent “clear and 
convincing evidence” to the contrary, Breakiron, 642 F.3d at 
131, because “[i]n cases where the AEDPA standards of 
review do not apply, federal habeas courts apply pre-AEDPA 
standards of review,” Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 100, and pre-
AEDPA, “federal habeas courts [had] no license to 
redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor ha[d] 
been observed by the state trial court, but not by them,” 
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). 
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performance was deficient and, second, whether Vickers has 
established the requisite prejudice. 10   
1. Strickland Performance Prong  
 We begin with Strickland’s performance prong.  When 
assessing whether a petitioner has demonstrated that his 
attorney’s representation was constitutionally deficient, we 
look to “the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time 
of counsel’s conduct,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, and 
evaluate whether counsel’s performance “fell below an 
                                              
 10 We may begin our analysis with either of 
Strickland’s two prongs and follow “the practical suggestion 
in Strickland [that we] consider the prejudice prong before 
examining the performance of counsel prong” where that 
approach “is less burdensome to defense counsel,” Lilly, 536 
F.3d at 196, or makes it “easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  Here, 
however, neither of those circumstances pertain, as we have a 
fully developed record from the PCRA hearing at which 
counsel already testified, the District Court addressed both 
deficiency and prejudice, and our review of the particular 
deficiencies alleged here may provide guidance to trial courts 
and defense counsel that will benefit, not burden, the criminal 
justice system.  See id. (encouraging reviewing courts to 
review ineffectiveness claims in a way that does not “become 
so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal 
justice system suffers as a result”). We therefore will address 
both components of the Strickland inquiry. 
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objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing 
professional norms,”  id. at 688.   
 Vickers has met this standard here because his 
attorney’s failure to ensure that he properly waived his right 
to a jury trial was not “within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”  Id. at 687.  The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by 
jury and that this right may only be ceded by a knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver.  See Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1973); Adams v. U.S. ex 
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276-77 (1942).  And the 
importance of this fundamental right is reflected in both the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Pennsylvania 
Criminal Code, which mandate that all waivers of jury trials 
be in writing, signed by both parties, and approved by the 
court on the record.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23; 234 Pa. Code § 
620.   
 Of course, the touchstone is whether a defendant’s 
jury-trial waiver is knowing and voluntary, so that the failure 
to comply with these procedures does not per se establish a 
constitutional violation.  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. 
Parrott, 476 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1973); 
Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 697-98 (Pa. 2008).  
At the same time, however, compliance provides strong 
assurance ex ante that the defendant has been fully apprised 
of his right to a jury trial and that his waiver is not subject to 
constitutional challenge.  As we have previously encouraged 
of our colleagues in the District Court in the context of Rule 
23 colloquies, such on-the-record assurances by the defendant 
himself that his waiver is knowing and voluntary will “help[] 
insulate a jury-trial waiver from later attack by a defendant 
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who claims he did not fully understand the nature of the right 
before he forfeited it . . . [and] will create a record capable of 
withstanding subsequent challenges, satisfy the court’s 
responsibility, facilitate intelligent appellate review, conserve 
scarce judicial resources, and enhance the finality of criminal 
convictions.”  Lilly, 536 F.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Under prevailing professional norms, competent 
defense counsel is expected to ensure a criminal defendant 
receives the benefit of those well-established procedures.  
 Vickers’s counsel, on the other hand, did not conduct 
any investigation to determine whether Vickers had been 
given an appropriate colloquy before his case was scheduled 
for a bench trial, and simply “assumed there had been a 
normal waiver at the bar and whatnot like that,” App. 99-100.  
Had counsel taken the minimal step of reviewing the case file, 
the docket, or the trial court record to confirm there had been 
a formal waiver—or had he simply inquired of the trial court, 
opposing counsel, prior defense counsel, or his own client to 
verify that a proper waiver had occurred—he would have 
discovered his assumption was in error and he could have 
ensured, consistent with the Pennsylvania Code, that the 
judge engaged in an appropriate colloquy and that Vickers 
waived his jury trial right in writing before proceeding with a 
bench trial.  Yet, he did not.  Nor did counsel review the 
colloquy form privately with Vickers to confirm that Vickers 
was apprised of all attendant aspects of his jury-trial right 
before he waived that right.   
 Although we are sympathetic to the difficult position 
in which counsel was placed when he inherited this case only 
weeks before trial, prevailing professional norms required and 
continue to require counsel in this circumstance to verify, 
through a review of the record or an inquiry with the court or 
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prior counsel, that the client formally waived his jury trial 
right.  See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) 
(holding that counsel’s failure to examine court file on past 
conviction prior to sentencing constituted deficient 
performance); cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 
(1986) (finding deficient performance where attorney failed 
to file a suppression motion “not due to strategic 
considerations, but because . . . he was unaware of the 
[constitutional violation]”).  Because counsel failed to do so 
here, his conduct fell below “an objective standard of 
reasonableness.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  
2. Strickland Prejudice Prong  
We turn next to the prejudice prong.  When assessing 
Strickland prejudice, we typically ask “whether the petitioner 
has shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different,” with “a reasonable probability” 
meaning “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  Here, however, 
between the arguments of the litigants and the relevant case 
law, we are confronted with two discrete ways to frame the 
prejudice analysis.   
 Vickers argues that because counsel’s ineffectiveness 
deprived him of his right to a jury trial and the deprivation of 
that right constitutes structural error, prejudice under 
Strickland must be presumed and Vickers is automatically 
entitled to relief.  The Commonwealth, on the other hand, 
argues that prejudice cannot be presumed and the relevant 
inquiry is whether the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different had Vickers been tried by a jury rather than a 
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judge.11  Below, we address: (a) whether prejudice even 
arguably could be presumed in this case; (b) if not, what 
prejudice inquiry is appropriate; and (c) how the proper 
prejudice inquiry applies to Vickers’s case.  
a) Whether Prejudice Should be Presumed  
 Turning first to Vickers’s contention that Strickland 
prejudice can be presumed, the Supreme Court has long held 
that constitutional errors do not require automatic reversal, 
and that courts may apply a “harmless error” analysis to 
determine whether the mistake affected the outcome of the 
trial.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).  The 
Supreme Court has also held, however, that there are certain 
errors, deemed “structural” errors that so “affect[] the 
framework within which the trial proceeds” that they cannot 
                                              
 11  Vickers contends that because the Commonwealth 
addressed only Strickland’s performance prong in its opening 
brief, it has waived any argument based on the prejudice 
prong.  Although it is generally correct that an issue not 
raised in an appellant’s opening brief is waived, Laborers’ 
Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994), we may not relieve 
Vickers of his burden to prove both deficiency and prejudice 
to obtain habeas relief because federal courts are only 
empowered to grant the writ “on the ground that [the 
petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).  
We therefore reject Vickers’s contention that he is 
automatically entitled to relief if he can demonstrate deficient 
performance, and we will proceed to address whether Vickers 
was prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective performance.  
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be subject to harmless error analysis.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 
499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).  For example, the Supreme Court 
has identified the denial of the right to counsel of a 
defendant’s choice, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 
U.S. 140, 149-50 (2006), the denial of the right to a public 
trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 & n.9 (1984), and 
the denial of the right to self-representation, McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984), as errors “with 
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and 
indeterminate” such that reversal is required without further 
analysis when they occur, Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.  
See also United States v. Lewis, 802 F.3d 449, 461-62 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) (reviewing 
categories of cases constituting structural error).  
 Even accepting Vickers’s premise that prejudice may 
be presumed when counsel’s deficient performance results in 
structural error,12 Vickers would not be entitled to such a 
presumption here because no structural error resulted from his 
counsel’s deficiency. 
                                              
 12 This issue is currently pending before the Supreme 
Court, which granted certiorari in Weaver v. Massachusetts, 
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017), and held oral argument on April 19, 
2017, to address the question “whether a defendant asserting 
ineffective assistance that results in a structural error must, in 
addition to demonstrating deficient performance, show that he 
was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.”  See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at 3, Weaver v. Massachusetts, No. 16-240 
(S. Ct. Aug. 18, 2016), 2016 WL 4474568.  Given our 
disposition of Vickers’s claim, we have no cause to hold his 
case c.a.v. pending a decision in Weaver.  
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Whether the deprivation of the jury trial right itself 
constitutes structural error is a question that neither the 
Supreme Court nor this Court has squarely addressed.  The 
Supreme Court has discussed the “profound” importance of 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, observing that the 
right “reflect[s] a fundamental decision about the exercise of 
official power” in our criminal justice system.  Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).  And where a 
defendant has been completely denied the right to a jury trial 
because neither the trial court nor his attorney informs him of 
that right, at least one Court of Appeals has held the error is 
structural and prejudice should be presumed when evaluating 
an ineffective assistance claim.  See McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 
F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Miller v. Dormire, 310 
F.3d 600, 603 (8th Cir. 2002).  
 Here, however, Vickers does not and cannot claim he 
suffered a total deprivation of his right to a jury trial as a 
result of his counsel’s deficiency.  Indeed, the record is 
unambiguous that Vickers was apprised of his right to a jury 
trial because the state court found credible Vickers’s 
counsel’s testimony that he and Vickers discussed his right to 
a jury trial on multiple occasions—a finding we must 
presume to be correct, even on de novo review, Breakiron, 
642 F.3d at 131; Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 100.  Rather, Vickers 
argues that his waiver was rendered unintelligent and 
involuntary either because counsel failed to secure an on-the-
record waiver or because counsel did not specifically apprise 
him of all aspects of a jury trial, he was unaware of the 
requirement of juror unanimity when he waived.  The premise 
of this second argument is dubious at best, given the PCRA 
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court’s fact-finding to which we must defer.13  Id.  Even if we 
engage both arguments, however, they fail on the merits 
under controlling case law.  
 We have previously held, consistent with other Courts 
of Appeals that have addressed the issue, that an on-the-
record waiver, while probative and strongly encouraged, is 
not a prerequisite to a knowing and voluntary waiver and, 
hence, is not constitutionally required.  Parrott, 476 F.2d at 
1062; United States v. Boynes, 515 F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Rodriguez, 888 F.2d 519, 527 (7th 
Cir. 1989); see also Lilly, 536 F.3d at 197-98 (noting in the 
Rule 23 context that, while strongly advisable, an on-the-
record waiver colloquy is not a constitutional requirement).  
As relevant here, then, its omission is not per se constitutional 
error, much less structural error.  
 Nor has the Supreme Court or any Court of Appeals 
held to date that a defendant must be specifically apprised of 
the requirement of juror unanimity in order to knowingly and 
intelligently waive his jury-trial right.  On the contrary, the 
Courts of Appeals that have confronted that argument have 
rejected it.  See Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 833-34 
                                              
 13 Implicit in the state court’s credibility 
determinations is its finding that Vickers was aware that any 
jury verdict would have to be unanimous.  For example, the 
state court credited counsel’s testimony that Vickers 
“understood the difference between the two [types of trials],” 
App. 100, and rejected as incredible Vickers’s testimony, 
which included his assertion that he mistakenly believed at 
the time he could be convicted by only a majority of the 
jurors. 
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(6th Cir. 2004) (holding that knowledge of the juror 
unanimity requirement is not constitutionally required in 
order for a defendant to give a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of his right to a jury trial); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. 
DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding the 
Constitution requires only that the defendant understand “that 
the choice confronting him was, on the one hand, to be judged 
by a group of people from the community, and on the other 
hand, to have his guilt or innocence determined by a 
judge”).14  And even Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, governing the necessary procedures to ensure that 
a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary, does not require that a 
defendant be specifically apprised of the juror-unanimity 
requirement but only of his general “right to a jury trial,” to 
relinquish that right in connection with a plea waiver.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(C); see also United States v. Pagan-
Ortega, 372 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2004) (concluding that not 
even a Rule 11 violation, let alone a constitutional violation, 
occurred when defendant was not informed of his right to a 
unanimous jury as part of his plea colloquy).  While this 
                                              
 14 Vickers relies on the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in 
United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 1983), as 
support for his argument that a defendant must be informed of 
the unanimity requirement to give a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his right to a jury trial.  In Sowell, however, the 
Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected this reading of Martin, 
holding that Martin did not “establish[] a constitutional 
requirement that the defendant understand that the verdict 
must be unanimous.”  Sowell, 372 F.3d at 833.  
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Court has not yet opined on whether the failure to apprise a 
defendant of the unanimity requirement would render a jury-
trial waiver constitutionally infirm, it is sufficient for today’s 
purposes to observe that where there is a substantial question 
that such even results in constitutional error, it assuredly does 
not result in structural error.  See Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (explaining that structural errors are “a 
limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that ‘defy 
analysis by harmless error standards.’” (quoting Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 309).   
 Our conclusion that prejudice must be demonstrated, 
not presumed, in this circumstance is further supported by the 
approach the Supreme Court and this Court have taken in 
addressing similar claims in the past.  In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court was presented with an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on counsel’s 
failure to inform a petitioner of the parole consequences of 
his guilty plea, and despite petitioner’s allegation that this 
lack of complete information about the right that he was 
relinquishing made his entire guilty plea “involuntary” and 
“unintelligent,” id. at 56—an allegation closely tracking 
Vickers’s—the Court explicitly held that a prejudice analysis 
was necessary before relief could be granted and proceeded to 
address that prong of the petitioner’s Strickland claim, id. at 
59.   
 Likewise, in United States v. Lilly, we were presented 
with a claim of ineffective assistance nearly identical to 
Vickers’s when a petitioner, who had been in the courtroom 
when counsel waived his jury-trial right in favor of a bench 
trial and who had signed a formal waiver form only after the 
trial, asserted that he had not been fully apprised of his right 
to a jury trial and thus had not waived it knowingly and 
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voluntarily.  536 F.3d at 192-93.  To determine whether 
petitioner had established ineffective assistance, we did not 
simply presume prejudice but performed a traditional 
Strickland prejudice analysis before ultimately concluding 
that he was not entitled to relief.  Id. at 196.  Thus, while we 
leave for another day whether a total failure to inform a 
defendant of his right to a jury trial could give rise to a claim 
of structural error, cf. McGurk, 163 F.3d at 474, we hold, 
consistent with Hill and Lilly, where a defendant has been 
apprised of his basic right to a jury trial, counsel’s failure to 
inform him of certain aspects of that right does not give rise 
to structural error.  And, absent structural error, there is no 
colorable argument that prejudice should be presumed in this 
case.   
b) Determining the Proper Prejudice Test  
Having concluded that a showing of prejudice is 
required, we next address what that showing should be.  The 
Commonwealth argues in favor of the approach we 
articulated in Lilly, where we held that a petitioner who was 
convicted upon a bench trial and claimed prejudice as a result 
of his counsel’s failure to ensure a valid jury-trial waiver 
must show a reasonable probability that “in the absence of 
counsel’s advice, another fact finder (i.e., a jury) would have 
been reasonably likely to arrive at a different outcome.” 536 
F.3d at 196.  Although Lilly correctly reflects that we must 
address the prejudice question as part of our Strickland 
analysis, a trio of Supreme Court cases explaining the 
appropriate inquiry in similar circumstances illustrates that a 
modification to Lilly’s prejudice test is necessary.   
First, in Hill, as noted above, the Court considered an 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on counsel’s 
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deficiently informing petitioner of the consequences of his 
guilty plea.  474 U.S. at 55.  When addressing Strickland’s 
prejudice prong, the Court did not focus on whether counsel’s 
deficient performance caused the outcome of the proceeding 
to change—i.e., the court did not speculate as to whether 
petitioner would have been convicted had he gone to trial 
instead of pleading—but instead asked “whether counsel’s 
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome 
of the plea process.”  Id. at 59.  Because the appropriate focus 
went to the process that led to petitioner forfeiting a 
constitutional right, the Court held that the petitioner could 
demonstrate prejudice if he could show a “reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  Id.   
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega, the Court applied similar 
reasoning when addressing the appropriate prejudice inquiry 
for a petitioner alleging that counsel’s deficient performance 
led him to forfeit his right to a direct appeal of his conviction.  
528 U.S. 470, 475 (2000).  The Court again framed the 
inquiry in terms of the process leading up to the petitioner’s 
decision to forego a judicial proceeding to which he was 
constitutionally entitled, holding that the petitioner could 
demonstrate prejudice if he could show that his counsel’s 
ineffective performance led to his not pursuing an appeal that 
he “otherwise would have taken.”  Id. at 484.  Because the 
petitioner had been deprived of the proceeding altogether, the 
Court explained that it would be “unfair to require a[] . . . 
defendant to demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might 
have had merit” and a showing that “but for counsel’s 
deficient conduct, he would have appealed” was all that 
Strickland requires.  Id. at 486.  
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Most recently in Lafler, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that this process-based analysis, focusing on whether a 
petitioner lost his ability to exercise a constitutional 
protection he otherwise would have invoked, is necessary to 
evaluate prejudice for ineffective assistance claims alleging a 
defect in the process leading up to a judicial proceeding.  566 
U.S. at 169.  In Lafler, the petitioner claimed ineffective 
assistance when his counsel advised him against accepting a 
guilty plea by erroneously insisting that the prosecution 
would be unable to establish an element of the crime for 
which he was charged.  556 U.S. at 161.  Thus, Lafler 
presented the inverse of Hill as, rather than being induced to 
accept a guilty plea as a result of counsel’s ineffectiveness, 
the petitioner in Lafler alleged that his counsel’s deficient 
performance forced him to stand trial and receive a harsher 
sentence than he would have had he accepted the plea.  Id. at 
163-64.   
The Court explicitly rejected the Government’s 
argument that there could be no Strickland prejudice because 
“[a] fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by 
defense counsel during plea bargaining,” and held that the 
petitioner could show prejudice if he could demonstrate that 
but for counsel’s ineffective assistance, “he and the trial court 
would have accepted the guilty plea.”  Id. at 174.  Although 
acknowledging that the “[t]he goal of a just result is not 
divorced from the reliability of a conviction,” the Court in 
Lafler made explicit the principle underlying its decisions in 
Hill and Flores-Ortega—that when evaluating prejudice in 
the context of a pre-trial error that changed the nature of the 
subsequent proceedings, the “question is not the fairness or 
reliability of the trial but the fairness and regularity of the 
processes that preceded it, which caused the defendant to lose 
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benefits he would have received in the ordinary course but for 
counsel’s ineffective assistance.”  Id. at 169.  
Lafler  requires us to revisit the prejudice analysis we 
applied in Lilly.  At the time Lilly was decided, it was 
apparent that a Strickland prejudice inquiry was necessary for 
certain claims of ineffective assistance that led to a 
deprivation of pre-trial process rights, but it was not clear 
how broadly the Court intended to apply the prejudice test it 
announced in Hill and Flores-Ortega.  While those cases 
addressed the appropriate way to frame Strickland prejudice 
when counsel’s ineffective assistance caused a defendant to 
forego a judicial proceeding altogether—i.e., a trial in Hill 
and a direct appeal in Flores-Ortega—they did not squarely 
address the situation presented in Lilly, Lafler, and the case 
before us here, where, despite counsel’s pre-trial ineffective 
assistance, the defendant received, and ultimately was 
convicted in, an error-free trial.  In light of this ambiguity, we 
did not extend Hill and Flores-Ortega to the circumstances 
before us in Lilly, and reverted to the language the Court had 
used in Strickland, that a finding of prejudice requires “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.” Lilly, 536 F.3d at 196 (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694).   
 After Lafler, however, there is no longer any 
ambiguity about the proper prejudice test in this situation.  
Lafler makes clear that the process-based test of Hill and 
Flores-Ortega is not limited to situations in which counsel’s 
ineffectiveness prevented a judicial proceeding from 
occurring at all, but also applies when the defendant 
ultimately received a fair adjudication, so long as counsel’s 
ineffectiveness affects not the propriety of the adjudicatory 
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proceeding itself, but “the fairness and regularity of the 
processes that preceded it.”  Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169.  And 
when Hill, Flores-Ortega, and Lafler are read together, there 
is no question that where a defendant claims ineffective 
assistance based on a pre-trial process that caused him to 
forfeit a constitutional right, the proper prejudice inquiry is 
whether the defendant can demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, he would 
have opted to exercise that right. 
We therefore revise our prejudice test set forth in 
Lilly,15 and turn to the dispositive question here: whether 
Vickers has met his burden by establishing on this record a 
reasonable probability that but for his counsel’s failure to 
ensure a proper waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to be 
tried before a jury, he would have exercised that right. 
c) Application of the Proper Prejudice Test  
                                              
 15 Our holding regarding the appropriate prejudice 
inquiry in this context, which merely aligns Lilly with the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Lafler, does not 
necessitate en banc review.  As occurs from time to time, “a 
panel of our Court may decline to follow a prior decision of 
our Court without the necessity of an en banc decision when 
the prior decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision.”  
United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2009); see 
also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 192 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1980) (“As an inferior court in the federal 
hierarchy, we are, of course, compelled to apply the law 
announced by the Supreme Court as we find it on the date of 
our decision.”).  
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Applying this prejudice analysis to the facts of this 
case, we conclude that Vickers has not met his burden.  
Although counsel was deficient in failing to ensure that 
Vickers had properly waived his right to a jury trial before 
proceeding with a bench trial, the record is devoid of any 
credible evidence that Vickers otherwise would have opted 
for a jury trial and affirmatively indicates that he made an 
informed, strategic decision to proceed with a bench trial after 
numerous consultations with his counsel.  
Even though we review the state court’s legal 
conclusions de novo, we continue to defer under AEDPA to 
its factual and credibility findings, Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 100, 
and here, the state court found Vickers’s counsel credible 
when he testified that he and Vickers discussed the possibility 
of a jury trial each time they spoke, that he explained to 
Vickers that a jury trial would mean that “12 men and women 
decide the facts of the case as opposed to a judge deciding the 
facts,” and that even on the morning of the trial he reminded 
Vickers that he was facing “serious charges” and could still 
ask for a jury trial, but Vickers “indicated he wanted to go 
forward.”  App. 95, 98.   
Most importantly, counsel testified that he explained to 
Vickers the strategic advantages he perceived in pursuing a 
bench trial, i.e., he believed a bench trial was Vickers’s best 
chance to be acquitted on the most serious charge he faced—
aggravated assault; it would be difficult for the 
Commonwealth to prove that Vickers had the requisite intent 
to commit aggravated assault based on just one punch; and, 
when pursuing this theory, there would be a “tactical 
advantage” to selecting a bench trial because a judge was 
more likely than a jury to appreciate this “narrow legal issue.”  
App. 107, 109.  Counsel discussed this strategy with Vickers, 
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warned Vickers that there was risk inherent in choosing a 
bench trial because the “courtroom can be a conservative with 
personal injuries,” App. 95, and recommended nonetheless 
that Vickers proceed by way of bench trial.  Vickers’s 
responses led his counsel to believe Vickers was aware of his 
right to proceed by way of jury trial, that he “understood the 
difference,” between a jury trial and a bench trial, App. 100, 
and that he was choosing for strategic reasons to proceed with 
a bench trial.  
The only evidence in the record to the contrary, 
Vickers’s testimony that he repeatedly requested a jury trial 
and did not know he had a right to a jury trial until he was 
preparing his appeal, was deemed “not credible” by the 
PCRA court.  App. 176.  Thus, although counsel erroneously 
failed to ensure that Vickers waived on the record and, even 
assuming counsel’s deficiency left Vickers unaware of the 
requirement of juror unanimity, Vickers has not established 
on this record a “reasonable probability” that, but for 
counsel’s deficiency, Vickers would have elected to proceed 
by way of jury trial.  Accordingly, he has failed to 
demonstrate the prejudice Strickland requires in this 
circumstance, and his habeas petition must be denied. 
IV. Conclusion  
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order granting Vickers a writ of habeas corpus and 
remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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